Algorithm for tracking violators in multi-address key distribution schemes

Authors

  • Valerii Zakusilo Institute of special communication and information protection of National technical university of Ukraine «Igor Sikorsky Kyiv polytechnic institute», Kyiv, Ukraine https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6906-2742
  • Serhii Koniushok Institute of special communication and information protection of National technical university of Ukraine «Igor Sikorsky Kyiv polytechnic institute», Kyiv, Ukraine https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4121-1464

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.20535/2411-1031.2025.13.2.344838

Keywords:

cybersecurity, cyber defense, cryptography, traitor tracing, multi-address key distribution scheme

Abstract

The article is devoted to the study of randomized multi-address key distribution schemes based on code constructions and their application for implementing traitor tracing schemes. A multi-address key distribution scheme is a cryptographic protocol in which a key distribution center transmits certain auxiliary information (to which only authorized users should have access) to subscribers of a communication network so that, over time, in the event of compromise of the cryptographic keys of some subscribers, whose list the key distribution center has managed to establish, other subscribers will be able to restore the shared cryptographic key, which is transmitted in encrypted form from the key distribution center via a broadcast communication channel. At the same time, subscribers whose keys have been compromised will not be able to decrypt the broadcast message. As can be seen, for such schemes to function successfully, there is a need for approaches and tools to establish a list of compromised subscribers (for different tasks, there may be a need for either a complete list of such subscribers or at least one of them). Classic traitor tracing schemes can be the basis for building such tools because they were created to identify a user or group of unscrupulous users who transferred their keys to create an array of compromised keys that can be used for malicious purposes (the so-called “violators decoder”). However, with the growing number of subscribers, the rapid development of computing resources, the creation of adaptive attacks, and increasing privacy requirements, such schemes are becoming less effective. The approach proposed in the article aims to combine the capabilities of multi-address key distribution schemes and intruder tracking schemes while maintaining a balance between the accuracy of intruder tracking and the efficiency of available computing resources. Thanks to the use of Geffding's estimates, the algorithm constructed in the article is -identifying, i.e., it is capable of guaranteeing the identification of at least one participant in any coalition that does not exceed  violators. The sufficient conditions given for the code parameters provide a significant improvement over the classical ones. It is demonstrated that the randomized approach preserves the stability of the system and does not degrade the security properties of the original scheme, but significantly enhances its ability to distinguish users in case of key compromise. The analytical expressions obtained in the article allow obtaining accurate lower bounds on the reliability of the traitor tracing algorithm, which, in turn, can be used in the practical construction of randomized traitor tracing protocols with a given required (high) reliability.

Author Biographies

Valerii Zakusilo, Institute of special communication and information protection of National technical university of Ukraine «Igor Sikorsky Kyiv polytechnic institute», Kyiv

postgraduate

Serhii Koniushok, Institute of special communication and information protection of National technical university of Ukraine «Igor Sikorsky Kyiv polytechnic institute», Kyiv

associate professor, candidate of technical sciences, deputy head of the Institute (for scientific work)

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Published

2025-11-27

How to Cite

Zakusilo, V., & Koniushok, S. (2025). Algorithm for tracking violators in multi-address key distribution schemes. Collection "Information Technology and Security", 13(2), 216–224. https://doi.org/10.20535/2411-1031.2025.13.2.344838

Issue

Section

NETWORK AND APPLICATION SECURITY